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I. Introduction
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
(ATRA, P.L. 112-240) may be more significant for
what it does not do than for what it does. Hopes for
a ‘‘grand bargain’’ were not realized. In fact, ATRA
does (almost) nothing to address the major fiscal
problems that the United States continues to face.
No one seems pleased with ATRA. Noticeably
absent were the self-congratulations among mem-
bers of Congress that usually accompany the pas-
sage of significant legislation1 — and for good
reason. Even the bill’s title leaves something to be
desired. The ‘‘Act of 2012’’ was not passed by
Congress until 2013.
The primary focus here is not on the broader
merits or demerits of ATRA, but rather on the issue
of tax policy uncertainty. The fiscal cliff represented
an extreme case of (manufactured) policy uncer-
tainty. A growing body of research suggests that
policy uncertainty imposes substantial economic
costs in and of itself. ATRA substantially lessened
U.S. tax policy uncertainty over the very short term
by, for the most part, making permanent the Bush
tax cuts.
However, all is not well. Policy uncertainty re-
mains high. Under ATRA, added revenue will come
from taxpayers at the top of the income distribution,
but that will barely make a dent in the deficits that
the United States has been running. Based on
projections from the Congressional Budget Office,
the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of
Management and Budget, Veronique de Rugy
1Instead of enjoying a signing ceremony, the bill was signed
into law via autopen in President Obama’s absence. See
‘‘Obama’s Staff Uses Autopen to Sign ‘Fiscal Cliff’ Legislation,’’
The Weekly Standard, blog post (Jan. 3, 2013).
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shows that (over the next 10 years) ATRA is ex-
pected to add $332 billion in spending and $620
billion in added revenues. By contrast, projected
deficit spending over the same 10 years is order of
magnitudes larger than the projected deficit reduc-
tions fromATRA.2 A strong recovery from the Great
Recession would be a big help, but major structural
problems would still remain.
Post ATRA, the problem of sequestration remains
front and center. ATRA extended the start date for
sequestration called for in the Budget Control Act of
2011 from January 1 to March 1. Even those wanting
to cut the budget do not want to do so in the
Procrustean manner laid out in current law. Thus,
those cuts are unlikely to materialize, but what will
take their place is anyone’s guess.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also remains a
source of some tax policy uncertainty. As enacted,
the individual mandate is set to start at the begin-
ning of 2014. However, the tax is so low that it will
be advantageous for many uninsured individuals to
pay the tax and forgo insurance until they need it.3
For the health insurance exchanges to function well
and keep costs down, it will likely be necessary to
substantially raise taxes from the individual man-
date.4 The only thing that is certain is that any
debate over the tax issue will be contentious and
heated.
Over the longer term, uncertainty looms. In the
coming decades, the U.S. federal tax system is
expected to bring in far less revenue than Congress
is projected to spend. Major changes are needed to
rein in programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and
Social Security, or major tax increases are needed —
or a combination of the two approaches. Longtime
budget expert Robert Reischauer (who served as
director of the CBO and president of the Urban
Institute) has said, ‘‘The path we’re on can’t go on
for fifteen years. Whether it can go on for two, three,
or four years, I have no idea.’’5
That near- and longer-term uncertainty is not
good for the economy. Research is finding that
uncertainty in and of itself has negative implica-
tions for the economy, slowing economic growth
and possibly prolonging a weak recovery. Policy
uncertainty has been shown to reduce investment
and to cause companies and individuals to misal-
locate resources. All those things impose costs on
society.6
A recent paper found that policy uncertainty
could explain the United States’ poor economic
performance in recent years.7 The authors predict
that policy uncertainty similar to what their meas-
ures show the United States has faced in recent
years will result in a reduction in real GDP by 2.2
percent and a loss of 2.5 million jobs. The costs of
uncertainty should be distinguished from the fact
that uncertainty may arise from increased prospects
for harmful policies. In recent years, those two
factors (that is, uncertainty itself and the increased
likelihood of inferior economic policy) have often
been positively correlated. While policy uncertainty
imposes economic costs, so too does a shift toward
a bad policy environment.8
II. ATRA and Tax Policy Uncertainty
A host of tax and spending changes were nomi-
nally ushered in on January 1, a day before ATRA
became law, retroactively averting the fiscal cliff.
The act permanently extends the Bush-era indi-
vidual income tax rates for more than 99 percent of
taxpayers, while allowing rates for single filers with
taxable incomes exceeding $400,000 ($425,000 for
heads of household and $450,000 for joint filers) to
return to their pre-2001 levels. The statutory mar-
ginal tax rate for that top income group increased
from 35 to 39.6 percent for ordinary income. The
effective marginal tax rate increase is larger because
that group also faces the reintroduction of Pease
and PEP (that is, phaseouts for up to 80 percent of
itemized deductions and 100 percent of personal
exemptions). Those phaseouts affect taxpayers
other than those in the highest bracket, because they
are based on adjusted gross income instead of
2See Veronique de Rugy, ‘‘What Congress Gave Us in the
Fiscal Cliff Deal,’’ Mercatus Center, Jan. 7, 2013, available at
http://mercatus.org/publication/what-congress-gave-us-fiscal
-cliff-deal.
3Martin Feldstein, ‘‘Obamacare’s Nasty Surprise,’’ The Wash-
ington Post, Nov. 6, 2009.
4Some taxes from the ACA, such as surtaxes on some
high-income taxpayers, take effect in 2013, with others to take
effect later. Those tax increases have been a source of uncer-
tainty. However, the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision preserving
most of the ACA, along with Obama’s reelection, has lifted most
of that uncertainty.
5David Wessel, Red Ink: Inside the High-Stakes Politics of the
Federal Budget 29 (2012).
6On the related issue of the costs of budget uncertainty
resulting from late appropriations and continuing resolutions,
see Philip G. Joyce, ‘‘The Costs of Budget Uncertainty: Analyz-
ing the Impact of Late Appropriations,’’ IBM Center for the
Business of Government, 2012: Washington, available at http://
www.businessofgovernment.org/report/costs-budget-uncertai
nty-analyzing-impact-late-appropriations.
7Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, ‘‘Mea-
suring Economic Policy Uncertainty,’’ working paper, Jan. 2013,
available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/media/
BakerBloomDavis.pdf.
8For example, if it were decided some time ago that the
United States would go over the fiscal cliff with certainty, the
costs to the economy would likely have been substantial.
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taxable income and kick in at $250,000 for single
filers ($300,000 for joint filers).9
Marginal tax rates for most dividends and (long-
term) capital gains for those in this new top bracket
rose from 15 to 20 percent. That is a return to the
pre-2001 level for capital gains but treats dividends
much more favorably than pre-2001 law, which
taxed them as ordinary income.10 ATRA made im-
portant changes to other areas, including the estate
tax; the alternative minimum tax; and many credits,
deductions, and phaseouts.11
At the center of the fiscal cliff debate that resulted
in ATRA were the Bush (or Bush-era) tax cuts
passed in 2001, 2003, and 2004.12 Those tax cuts
were mostly extended for two years through 2012
by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reau-
thorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (Job
Creation Act). Other legislation, such as the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, in-
cluded important tax provisions that often carried
the same expiration date as the Bush tax cuts. The
CBO projected that federal revenues would have
increased by $5.4 trillion over the next 10 years had
all the tax provisions expired (with the bulk of that
hypothetical increase in revenues resulting from not
indexing the AMT for inflation).13
A. The Budget Process and Policy Uncertainty
While the fiscal cliff debate and the ongoing debt
ceiling and sequestration debacle reflect a deep
divide between the political parties and possibly
greater acrimony among members of Congress, part
of the problem emanates from a budget process run
amok. The 1974 Congressional Budget Act (Budget
Act) created the CBO and the process for assessing
the budget implications of proposed legislation.
Lawmakers often game those budget rules, which
were intended to impose more prudent fiscal policy.
As a result, the rules sometimes yield policy uncer-
tainty and policies that are less desirable than had
they not been in place.14 As former CBO Director
Rudy Penner testified in 1990:
We have a [budget] process that looks very
elegant on paper, but is leading to very dis-
honest and disorderly results. . . . It has done
an enormous amount of harm in spawning a
large number of gimmicks that make it very
difficult to analyze the budget anymore. These
gimmicks make investors and other outsiders
lose confidence in the government.15
More than two decades later, Penner’s critique still
has merit.
The history of the Bush tax cuts is a case in point.
Because the Bush tax cuts (at least those in 2001 and
2003) were passed via Congress’s reconciliation
process (which stems from the Budget Act), they
were subject to the Byrd Rule, which requires that
any tax or spending bill passed via reconciliation
not adversely affect the federal deficit outside the
10-year budget window.16 As a result, instead of
pushing permanent legislation that would offset the
reduction in revenues with cuts in spending
growth, Congress proposed temporary legislation
in the hope that it would be made permanent
later.17 The Bush tax cuts used the common practice
of phasing in the cuts over several years so that the
negative impact on the deficit would be reduced in
the early years, making projections over the 10-year
budget window more appealing than they would
be for fully phased-in legislation. Thus, as the Bush
tax cuts suggest, it is possible that the Budget Act
has yielded diminished fiscal responsibility and
greater policy uncertainty. The CBO and the Joint
Committee on Taxation produce cost estimates for
proposed legislation, but because Congress sets the
rules and then manipulates legislation accordingly,
the Budget Act may provide a false sense of due
diligence. Thus, while it is possible that the Budget
Act has had a positive impact on the budget process
and policy outcomes, such a statement is at least
debatable.189Those phaseouts are a backdoor way to raise tax rates. Pease
lowers itemized deductions by 3 percent of the difference
between AGI and the income threshold until itemized deduc-
tions are reduced by 80 percent. Personal exemptions are
reduced by 2 percent for every $2,500 that AGI exceeds the
threshold.
10In some cases, tax rates will be somewhat higher than
pre-2001 law because of ACA taxes targeted at the top of the
income distribution. ACA taxes were not affected by ATRA.
11ATRA, section 126.
12The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA); the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA); and the Working Families Tax Relief Act
of 2004.
13CBO, ‘‘The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2012 to 2022’’ (Jan. 2012), Doc 2012-1855, 2012 TNT 21-26.
14See Allen Schick and Felix Lostracco, The Federal Budget:
Politics, Policy, Process (2000).
15Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending
24 (2000).
16Because there was not enough support for the Bush tax cuts
to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, reconciliation was the
only viable option.
17See the Tax Foundation, ‘‘Why Are the Bush Tax Cuts
Expiring?’’ (May 26, 2010).
18For a critical view of the budget process, see Fisher’s
testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, ‘‘Improving the
Congressional Budget Process’’ (Oct. 12, 2011).
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B. ATRA and the Expiring Tax Legislation
For more than a decade, Congress has relied on
temporary or short-term fiscal policy, resulting in
numerous tax provisions that were set to expire at
the end of 2012.19 The expiration of those policies
would have amounted to a sharp tax increase for all
income taxpayers and (assuming that the AMT is
indexed for inflation) was projected to increase tax
revenues by $2.84 trillion over 10 years (Table 1).
The Bush tax cuts phased out the estate tax over
10 years; by 2010 the tax had been completely
phased out.20 It was set to return to pre-2001 levels
in 2011, which would have meant a 55 percent tax
rate with a $1 million exemption (not indexed for
inflation). Instead, ATRA set the estate tax rate at 35
percent (compared with 40 percent in 2012), with a
$5 million exemption (indexed for inflation).
ATRAmakes the AMT more palatable by perma-
nently adjusting it for inflation and makes planning
for both taxpayers and the IRS easier. Before ATRA,
Congress regularly passed patches that would ad-
just the AMT thresholds for inflation, but often only
for one year — and often retroactively applying to
the year just ending. The most recent AMT patch
expired before 2012. According to the CBO, if the
AMT patch had not been reintroduced, revenues
would have increased by $952 billion over 10 years
(Table 1); for 2012, the number of taxpayers subject
to the tax would have increased from 4 million to
more than 30 million.21
Had an inflation adjustment not been applied
retroactively to 2012, the IRS would have had to
delay processing tax returns for as many as 100
million filers until March 2013 or later.22 The IRS’s
computers were programmed in anticipation of a
patch, as in previous years. Had a patch (or perma-
nent indexation) not been passed, the complications
of the AMT and its interactions with the regular tax
code would have required a major overhaul of the
IRS’s computer programs.
When the current AMT was created in 1982,23
only 155 high-income households faced the tax.
Because the AMT was not automatically indexed
for inflation (unlike brackets for the regular income
tax, which are indexed), it hit taxpayers with lower
and lower real incomes each year. AMT liability
equals the person’s tax liability calculated under the
AMT minus their liability calculated under the
regular federal income tax, if positive. By lowering
tax liabilities under the regular federal income tax,
the Bush tax cuts increased tax liabilities under the
AMT. To offset that, the Bush tax cuts included an
AMT patch, but only for four years.
Congress’s persistent failure to address the AMT
was another artifact of the Budget Act and related
rules for assessing bills. One- or two-year patches
require the government to forgo revenue in only
one or two years of the 10-year budget window. If
Congress passes a one-year patch for 10 straight
years, the effect (over the 10-year period) would be
the same as a change that permanently indexed the
AMT. However, because the CBO and the JCT are
required to assume a current-law baseline when
19For an in-depth review of expiring tax provisions, see
Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, ‘‘An Overview of Tax Provisions
Expiring in 2012,’’ CRS Report for Congress, Apr. 2012 (Washing-
ton: Congressional Research Service). With respect to agricul-
ture policy, temporary or continually renewed policy has been
the norm for much longer than a decade. For example, the
congressional stalemate brought to light the so-called ‘‘milk
cliff’’ in which federal price supports were set to more than
double prices for milk and other milk-based products beginning
in 2013. The expiration of the most recent (five-year) farm bill
means that price supports would have reverted to a 1949
formula, which would have committed the U.S. government to
purchase milk until the market price was more than double
current market prices. The milk cliff was also averted as a result
of ATRA. See Bill Tomson, ‘‘Congress Averts ‘Dairy Cliff,’’’ The
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 1, 2013.
20The situation was actually considerably more complicated.
The 2010 tax extension, which extended most of the Bush tax
cuts for two additional years, set special rules for the estate tax.
Estates of those dying in 2010 could opt for either no estate tax,
but heirs would not receive the full step-up in basis normally
afforded to inheritances; or for an estate tax with a $5 million
exemption and a 35 percent rate (which applied to estates for
years 2011 and 2012). Most estates would be taxed more heavily
with no estate tax if no step-up in basis were allowed.
21See supra note 13.
22Jeanne Sahad, ‘‘Lack of AMT Fix Could Delay 100 Million
Tax Returns,’’ Dec. 19, 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com.
23A different AMT was created in 1969.
Table 1. Major Tax Components of the Fiscal Cliff a
Tax Provision Year Originally Enacted Length of Prior Extension 10-Year Revenue Estimate
EGTRRA and JGTRRA
(the Bush tax cuts)
2001 and 2003 Two years $2.84 trillionb
AMT patch 2006 No patch for 2012 $804 billion
Payroll tax cut 2010 One year $114 billion (2012 only)
Other tax extenders 2008 One year $839 billion
Source: Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office.
aInformation in the table is based on the scenario under which no cliff deal was reached.
bDebt service associated with the Bush tax cuts and AMT patch is an additional $790 billion between 2013 and 2022.
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assessing legislation, continual ad hoc changes will
always look better on paper.24 Thus, ATRA’s per-
manent indexation for inflation (as well as making
permanent other provisions) is welcome in that it
not only reduces policy uncertainty but also is a
step toward more honest and transparent budget
practices.25
Another source of tax policy uncertainty heading
into 2013 was the 2 percentage point payroll tax cut
enacted as part of the Job Creation Act. The payroll
tax cut was advertised as a replacement for the
Making Work Pay credit. The payroll tax cut re-
duced the employee share of Social Security payroll
taxes in 2011 from 6.2 to 4.2 percent. Originally, the
payroll tax cut was presented as a one-year fiscal
stimulus, but it was extended for part of 2012 on a
last-minute vote in December 2011. In 2012 it was
extended for the remainder of the year. It was
unknown whether it would be extended for 2013 as
well. That it was not included in ATRA signals that
it was in fact temporary and is unlikely to reappear
soon. For 2011 and 2012, the CBO estimated that
forgone revenue from that tax cut totaled $225.7
billion.26
ATRA extended other tax provisions, generally
through 2013. The term ‘‘tax extenders’’ has no
single definition — for example, some considered
the Bush tax cut extensions and the AMT patches to
be tax extenders, while others include only miscel-
laneous tax provisions. We define tax extenders as
regularly recurring tax extensions that have not
already been addressed; more specifically, we use
the term to refer to a group of 80 or so temporary
tax provisions slated to expire within 10 years.27
The JCT breaks down28 expiring provisions by the
year in which they are set to expire.29 The CBO
(relying on analysis from the JCT) has projected that
a 10-year extension of those provisions would lower
revenues by $839 billion and add $173 billion to the
debt service — that is, additional interest payments
resulting from increased government borrowing.30
Alas, Congress was not about to waste the crisis
by failing to throw in pork to reward political
supporters and favored interests. According to one
report, the Family and Business Tax Cut Certainty
Act of 2012 ‘‘was copied and pasted into the fiscal
cliff legislation, yielding a victory for biotech com-
panies, wind-turbine-makers, biodiesel producers,
film studios — and their lobbyists.’’31 That legisla-
tion stalled in Congress last summer and was
presumed dead. Those provisions are expected to
cost taxpayers $76 billion over 10 years.32
C. Long-Term Policy Uncertainty
While the United States faces tremendous short-
term policy uncertainty, the long-term outlook is no
better. ATRA does not address the nation’s long-
term fiscal problems, so it seemed clear as 2013
began that policy uncertainty would continue to be
a major issue.
For many years (and predating the Great Reces-
sion), economists and other policy analysts have
warned that the government’s taxing and spending
policies are unsustainable.33 Long-run spending
commitments are out of line with long-run revenue
projections, given anything resembling current tax
policy (or historical measures of tax revenue as a
share of GDP). For more than a decade, special
bipartisan commissions have proposed reforms for
areas such as Social Security, tax policy, and the
nation’s overall fiscal position,34 but Congress has
not acted on any of their recommendations. To the
extent that Congress and the president do act, it is
24The baseline is the scenario that is used for reference when
measuring the revenue or expenditure implications of legisla-
tion. For their official revenue estimates, CBO and JCT are not
permitted to make predictions concerning future actions by
Congress. Rather, they are to assume that the laws on the books
will not change. For example, they are not to assume that
Congress will extend theAMT patch, even though it has done so
for many consecutive years.
25Other provisions made permanent by ATRA include the
expansion of the earned income tax credit and the child tax
credit that were part of the 2009 stimulus package.
26For government accounting purposes, general revenues are
credited to Social Security to make up for revenue losses from
the payroll tax cut.
27See, e.g., Table 2 in Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, ‘‘An Over-
view of Tax Provisions Expiring in 2012,’’ CRS R42485 (Apr. 17,
2012), Doc 2012-8221, 2012 TNT 76-17.
28JCT, ‘‘List of Expiring Federal Tax Provisions 2011-2022,’’
JCX-1-12 (Jan. 13, 2012), Doc 2012-356, 2012 TNT 5-52.
29For revenue estimates, see CBO, ‘‘Expiring Tax Provisions
— January 2012 Baseline’’ (Jan. 31, 2012). JCT provided CBO
with many of the numbers presented.
30See supra note 13, at 21.
31Timothy P. Carney, ‘‘How Corporate Tax Credits Got in the
‘Cliff’ Deal,’’ The Washington Examiner, Jan. 2, 2013.
32JCT, ‘‘Estimated Revenue Effects of the Revenue Provisions
Contained in an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to
H.R. 8, ‘the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012,’’’ JCX-1-13
(Jan. 1, 2013), Doc 2013-5, 2013 TNT 2-13.
33In a 2005 interview with C-SPAN’s Brian Lamb, then-CBO
Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin said, ‘‘I often say to people, you
know, these are good old days, enjoy it.’’
Holtz-Eakin was not the first CBO director to warn of the
nation’s long-term fiscal problems. Those warnings became
then-Government Accountability Office Director David
Walker’s primary mission. Dating back to at least 1993, Peter G.
Peterson has warned of the unsustainability of U.S. entitlement
programs. See Peterson, Facing Up: How to Rescue the Economy
From Crushing Debt and Restore the American Dream (1993).
34President Bush established the Commission to Strengthen
Social Security as well as the President’s Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform. Obama established the National Commis-
sion on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (also known as the
Bowles-Simpson Commission).
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often to worsen the long-term fiscal outlook. For
example, consider the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act, which ex-
panded prescription drug coverage to Medicare in
2003. Other scholars make similar arguments re-
garding Obama’s healthcare legislation.35
Richard Evans, Laurence Kotlikoff, and Kerk
Phillips36 have estimated the fiscal gap (that is, the
difference between spending obligations and ex-
pected revenues) at a staggering $211 trillion in
present value terms.37 By comparison, annual U.S.
GDP is about $15 trillion. To address that imbal-
ance, taxes would have to be permanently increased
by 64 percent or spending would need to be cut by
40 percent. If the gap is filled solely by raising taxes,
tax revenues would rise to 26.7 percent of GDP, or
roughly 50 percent above the post-World War II
average of 17.7 percent.38 The key driver of the
fiscal gap is entitlement spending, and particularly
government spending on healthcare (for example,
Medicare).
The United States spent (from government and
private sources) about 18 percent of GDP on health-
care in 2011. For years, spending on healthcare has
grown more rapidly than the overall economy.
Because government plays a large (and growing)
role in financing healthcare, that trend has strained
government budgets.39 Depending on the fiscal
constraints used by the federal government, the
CBO estimates that Medicare spending will grow to
6.7 percent of GDP by 2037 while Medicaid, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, and ACA’s
subsidized exchanges will reach 3.7 percent of
GDP.40 Those estimates do not include tax expendi-
tures that are used to subsidize healthcare and
health insurance, which totaled $187 billion for
2011.41 Similarly, Social Security outlays are ex-
pected to increase from 5 to 6.2 percent of GDP by
2037.42 The trajectory for those programs poses
serious problems, further exacerbated by the fact
that the federal government continued to run sub-
stantial deficits, even before the Great Recession. If
the fiscal imbalances continue to go unaddressed,
payments on debt obligations will grow rapidly.
The CBO’s 10-year outlook estimates that debt
servicing as a percentage of GDP will rise a full
percentage point by 2022, with further increases
projected.43
III. The Economic Costs of Policy Uncertainty
There is no consensus on how best to measure
policy uncertainty or the magnitude of the associ-
ated costs, but it is well established that policy
uncertainty adversely affects the economy. We cat-
egorize the three main avenues of harm addressed
in the literature as decision paralysis, resource
misallocation, and capital flight (or hibernation)
from fear of regime change. We add a fourth
avenue: increased rent seeking. We contend that
added rent seeking, triggered by uncertainty, repre-
sents an additional drag on the economy, and we
believe it is a contributing factor to the overall
economic costs of policy uncertainty.
A. Uncertainty and Economic Performance
In a working paper, Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom,
and Stephen Davis provided several indices meas-
uring uncertainty, most of which date back to
1985.44 They included indices for policy-related
economic uncertainty and financial uncertainty, as
well as an overall uncertainty index and an index
measuring tax policy uncertainty (based on expir-
ing tax legislation).
The authors argued that policy uncertainty has
become a larger component of overall economic
uncertainty in the last 10 years. Figure 1 suggests
that some of the rise in overall policy uncertainty
may be attributed to heightened tax policy uncer-
tainty. The authors based their annual measure of
tax policy uncertainty on the number of expiring tax
provisions.45 However, that number might not ac-
curately reflect the economic importance of those
provisions, because the dollar value of expiring
provisions varies.
35The ACA remains a highly partisan issue, and respected
economists disagree on its net fiscal impact. See, e.g., Charles
Blahous, ‘‘The Fiscal Consequences of the Affordable Care Act,’’
Mercatus Center (Apr. 10, 2012); Holtz-Eakin and James C.
Capretta, ‘‘Resetting the ‘Obamacare’ Baseline,’’ Politico.com,
Dec. 16, 2010.
36Richard W. Evans et al., ‘‘Game Over: Simulating Unsus-
tainable Fiscal Policy,’’ National Bureau of Economic Research
working paper (2012).
37National Public Radio, ‘‘A National Debt of $14 Trillion?
Try $211 Trillion,’’ Aug. 6, 2011.
38Authors’ calculations are based on CBO data, supra note 13,
and on Office of Management and Budget 2012 Historical
Tables, ‘‘Table 1.2 — Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Sur-
pluses or Deficits as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2017.’’ Because of
chronic deficits, post-WWII federal spending as a share of the
economy is more than 2 percentage points higher than tax
revenues.
39Some argue that the causation is reversed and that govern-
ment involvement is a major driver in healthcare spending.
40CBO, ‘‘The 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook’’ (June 1,
2012), at 49, Doc 2012-12113, 2012 TNT 109-23.
41Authors’ calculations are from OMB, ‘‘Fiscal Year 2013
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government’’ (Feb.
2012), Doc 2012-2944, 2012 TNT 30-43.
42Supra note 40, at 71.
43See supra note 13, at 50.
44Baker et al., supra note 7.
45This measure is discounted to allow for the time to
expiration and also to reflect that many expiring tax provisions
are routinely renewed.
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The authors found that policy uncertainty can
impose negative effects on investment, consump-
tion (and GDP, of which investment and consump-
tion are primary components), and employment.
According to estimates from the authors’ model,
‘‘an increase in policy uncertainty equivalent to the
actual increase from 2006 to 2011 is followed by a
decline of about 2.2 percent in real GDP and 13
percent in private sector investment and an em-
ployment drop of around 2.5 million persons.’’46
They found that policy uncertainty accounted for a
relatively small share of economic uncertainty in
the 1990s and for a larger portion after 9/11. The
authors concluded that most movements in overall
economic uncertainty in recent years could be at-
tributed to policy uncertainty.
The authors do not examine the process by which
uncertainty harms the economy but rather report
strong negative correlations between uncertainty
measures and economic activity. They note various
avenues (addressed in the literature) by which
uncertainty imposes economic costs and argue that
their findings are consistent with those underlying
processes.
B. Decision Paralysis
Consider a stylized world in which a venture
capitalist is considering investing in either ethanol
production or solar energy investment alternatives,
each of which require substantial sunken (or irre-
versible) costs. In the presidential race, one candi-
date, in an effort to appeal to farm states, promises
increased tax subsidies for ethanol. Another candi-
date, in an effort to appeal to environmentalists,
promises a new tax subsidy for solar energy.47 A
venture capitalist, deciding where to invest, pro-
duces the following matrix:
The first number in each cell is the net return
from an investment made ex ante (to the policy
46Baker et al., supra note 7, note that ascribing a causal
relationship to their results requires strong assumptions.
47This example highlights the effect of uncertainty on invest-
ment decisions and does not consider the merits of either policy.
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Table 2. Policy Alternatives
Investment Ethanol Subsidy Solar Subsidy
Ethanol profit: x, y loss: z
Solar loss: z profit: x, y
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decision), whereas the second number is the net
return from an investment made ex post. No ex post
investment would ever be made in non-favored
sectors because they would be sure losers. If z were
0, then a rational investor would choose to invest ex
ante only if that return were greater than the ex post
return divided by the probability that the policy
that favors the investment is enacted — that is, if x
≥ y/Pr(win). Thus, if each policy is likely to occur
with equal probability, then xmust be at least equal
to twice the expected ex post return (that is, y). If z
were greater than 0, then x would need to be even
larger. While this is a very simple and highly
stylized example, it demonstrates how policy un-
certainty can lead to decision paralysis.
The example is consistent with findings by Fed-
eral Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, who showed that
under an ‘‘irreversibility’’ assumption, uncertainty
may lead to cyclical investment patterns in which
purchasing durable investments is delayed in favor
of holding liquid assets.48 Similarly, Dani Rodrik
found that policy uncertainty acts as a tax on
investment, retarding development in poorer na-
tions.49 Coupled with irreversibility, even positive
economic reform is of only limited success if it is not
certain to remain in place long term.50
C. Resource Misallocation
Policy uncertainty also can alter the allocation of
resources. That effect extends to companies making
investment or hiring decisions, as well as to people
making savings and labor market decisions. For
risk-averse individuals, uncertainty is likely to alter
behavior: People engage in precautionary measures
in response to uncertainty. Those precautionary
measures can be costly and increase the burden on
the economy.51
Francisco Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Luis Viceira
examined the impact of resource misallocations
resulting from uncertainty.52 They employed an
overlapping generations model and produced
excess-burden calculations to measure the costs of
misallocating resources. They focused on the effects
of uncertainty (on Social Security and income tax
rates) on measures such as wealth, income, con-
sumption, and portfolio allocation over one’s life
cycle.53 Under their baseline assumption, they re-
ported that uncertainty regarding future tax rates
results in a loss of 0.03 percent of annual income,
when effectively 9 percent of income is subject to
uncertainty. That number is sensitive to both the
magnitude of the uncertainty (that is, of potential
tax changes) and the level of risk aversion. The
authors concluded, ‘‘That households experience
sizable welfare gains from learning early about
future changes in benefits and tax rates regardless
of their attitudes toward risk or the uncertainty they
face about their own labor earnings.’’
In a 2012 paper, Ellen McGrattan found evidence
that tax policy uncertainty retards investment.54 She
found that uncertainty regarding taxes on indi-
vidual income, including corporate dividends and
undistributed profits, decreased investment signifi-
cantly during the 1930s. She wrote that tax policy
uncertainty, while not the cause or primary driver
of the Great Depression, played a larger role than
most believed, and likely both prolonged the De-
pression and increased its severity. However,
McGrattan wrote that it is not just uncertainty per
se that influences investment, but also whether the
uncertainty involves a potential shift toward a tax
policy that is less favorable to investment.
Also, responses to uncertainty might decrease
government revenues. Kevin Hassett and Gilbert
Metcalf found that uncertainty regarding U.S. in-
vestment tax credits may not have lowered invest-
ment but did lower federal revenues.55 Expectations
regarding investment tax incentives may increase
aggregate investment or simply alter the timing of
investment without affecting its overall level.
McGrattan also reported evidence of inter-temporal
shifting of investment during the 1930s as a result of
48Ben Bernanke, ‘‘Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Cyclical
Investment,’’ 98 Q. J. Econ. 85 (1983).
49Dani Rodrik, ‘‘Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment
in Developing Countries,’’ 36 J. Dev. Econ. 229 (1991).
50In conjunction with uncertainty, irreversibility tends to
reduce new investment; there is substantial literature on the
topic. However, investments that passed a cost-benefit test in an
earlier economic or political environment often cannot be un-
done later, even if they no longer appear prudent. That is, it is
possible for irreversibility, while reducing investment at the
margin, to raise the overall capital stock because of the ‘‘hang-
over’’ effect that prevents companies from reducing capital. See
Andrew B. Abel and Janice C. Eberly, ‘‘The Effects of Irrevers-
ibility and Uncertainty on Capital Accumulation,’’ 44 J. Mon-
etary Econ. 339 (1999).
51Excess burden— also known as deadweight loss or welfare
loss — is the net loss to society from the misallocation of
resources. It is effectively money left on the table and generally
results from government distortion of market prices or from
external costs or benefits associated with some goods or serv-
ices.
52Francisco Gomes et al., ‘‘The Excess Burden of Government
Indecision,’’ in Tax Policy and the Economy 125-163 (2011).
53Labor income data are taken from Joao Cocco et al.,
‘‘Consumption and Portfolio Choice Cover the Life-Cycle,’’ 18
Rev. Fin. Stud. 491.
54Ellen R. McGrattan, ‘‘Capital Taxation During the U.S.
Great Depression,’’ 127 Q. J. Econ. 1515 (2012).
55Kevin A. Hassett and Gilbert E. Metcalf, ‘‘Investment With
Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax Policy Discourage
Investment?’’ 109 Econ. J. 372 (1999).
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uncertainty. Again, the effect of uncertainty is re-
lated to the direction in which tax changes might
occur. Depending on the interrelationship, uncer-
tainty could even be associated with increased
economic activity; however, in general, that would
likely be the result of intertemporal shifting and not
persistent economic gains.
D. Capital Flight or Hibernation
Robert Higgs has argued that regime uncertainty
played a major role in the length and severity of the
Great Depression56 and explains the dearth of in-
vestment during that time. Higgs noted that it was
not until after World War II that those fears were
allayed and private investment returned to 1920s
levels. While acknowledging that arguments about
the pending end of the U.S. private-enterprise sys-
tem seem hyperbolic in retrospect, Higgs chronicles
political and legal events and includes data from
public opinion surveys to suggest that cataclysmic
views were real at the time. Herman Krooss exem-
plified Higgs’s point, concluding that ‘‘business
leaders sincerely believed that the government was
in evil hands . . . and preparing the way for social-
ism, communism, or some other variety of anti-
Americanism.’’57
Investment (and other economic activity) falters
because of fears that property rights are threatened.
That is not a cost of uncertainty per se, but a
reflection of the fact that uncertainty increases when
policies that would hamper economic growth be-
come more likely. Had the feared policy changes
actually occurred (with no uncertainty), the eco-
nomic implications would have been even more
serious. Some argue that regime uncertainty under-
lies the poor economic performance of the U.S.
economy since the Great Recession.58
Many fear the implications of unprecedented (at
least post-WWII) short-term budget deficits coupled
with severe long-term fiscal imbalances driven pri-
marily by entitlement programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security. Many would agree
that the United States is approaching a crossroads:
Drastic and painful reforms are needed just to con-
strain the federal government to its size since the end
of World War II. A not-implausible scenario is that
the United States will become more like Western
Europe, with the size of the federal government pos-
sibly increasing (as a share of GDP) by more than 50
percent over the next two generations.59
A Wall Street Journal op-ed by prominent econo-
mists (all of whom have served important roles in
government) chronicled the magnitude of the fed-
eral debt, increased regulations, and actions of the
Federal Reserve:
The problems are close to being unmanageable
now. If we stay on the current path, they will
wind up being completely unmanageable, cul-
minating in an unwelcome explosion and cri-
sis.60
That suggests that fears of regime uncertainty
may not be unwarranted — although the scenarios
are not nearly as extreme as the ones feared during
the 1930s, as described by Higgs (for example, fas-
cism or communism). To date, attempts to address
America’s problems have been met with political
stalemates, which contributed to the downgrading
of U.S. debt.
E. Tax Uncertainty, Destructive Entrepreneurship
William Baumol’s seminal work on rent seeking
and entrepreneurship built on the classic work of
Joseph Schumpeter. Baumol argued that entrepre-
neurship can be divided into productive, unproduc-
tive, and destructive activities.61 He chronicled
great innovations made over wide swaths of his-
tory, but he noted that in many cases those innova-
tions did little to improve the lots of most
individuals and that little effort was made to dis-
seminate them to the masses or to use them to
increase productivity.
Baumol argued that political and cultural insti-
tutions play a key role in whether innovations
improve productivity and economic growth. In
many preindustrial societies, the path to wealth was
through rulers, not the marketplace. That fostered
entrepreneurial rent seeking, which does not in-
crease the size of the economic pie. Neither did
56Robert Higgs, ‘‘Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great De-
pression Lasted So Long and Why Prosperity Resumed After
the War,’’ 1 Indep. Rev. 561 (1997).
57As quoted by Higgs.
58Mahmoud Haddad has suggested that business owners
were waiting for election results before opening or expanding
businesses. See Ned B. Hunter, ‘‘Businesses Waiting on Novem-
ber Results,’’ The Jackson Sun, Aug. 25, 2012.
59See supra note 40, at 146.
60George P. Shultz et al., ‘‘The Magnitude of the Mess We’re
In,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 16, 2012.
61William J. Baumol, ‘‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unpro-
ductive, and Destructive,’’ 98 J. Pol. Econ. 893 (Oct. 1990).
Baumol places little emphasis on the distinction between un-
productive and destructive entrepreneurship. Unproductive
activities would include simple rent seeking, in which resources
are wasted. Although Baumol is unclear on this, destructive
entrepreneurship could likely include rent seeking that success-
fully results in destructive economic policies — such as trade
restrictions, or even war.
Destructive and unproductive entrepreneurship are not re-
stricted to rent seeking. For example, governments could offer
contracts or rewards for wasteful or harmful entrepreneurial
activity.
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military innovations, which were often remunera-
tive for individuals but not for society at large.
Governments rewarded military innovations, but
the wars in which those innovations were em-
ployed often slowed economic development. An
important insight from Baumol is that it is not just
the degree of entrepreneurship that is central to
economic growth, but also the allocation of entre-
preneurship between constructive activities and un-
productive or destructive ones.
Although Baumol did not address politically
induced economic uncertainty, our hypothesis is
that policy uncertainty is a signal that government
is open for business: Policies are going to change,
and politicians are receptive to policy changes. With
little policy uncertainty, higher returns might be
sought from investing in productive activities.
However, when government is receptive to policy
changes, the returns from rent seeking (through
lobbying, political action committees, etc.) may be
more appealing.62
There is evidence that those rent-seeking strate-
gies are not irrational.63 Jonathan Forman found that
corporations that made more PAC contributions in
1985 and 1986 (during intense tax reform debates)
were rewarded with relatively more favorable tax
treatment following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A
similar relationship was not found when comparing
PAC contributions and future tax treatment over
years that did not span a reform and over which tax
uncertainty was presumably lower.
When policy uncertainty does not otherwise ex-
ist, lawmakers can manufacture it. For example,
they sometimes propose ‘‘milker’’ bills not intended
to actually become law, but rather to extort or
‘‘milk’’ rents from interested parties in exchange for
killing the proposal.64 Thus, even a period with
stable policies may contain substantial policy un-
certainty and concomitant losses to the economy
from rent seeking and unproductive entrepreneur-
ship.
In a 1991 study, Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert Vishny found evidence supporting Bau-
mol’s conception of unproductive or destructive
entrepreneurship.65 They looked at career decisions
across different countries and found that occupa-
tional choice is influenced by the relative returns in
different economic sectors. They argued that more
people will be drawn to law if rent seeking is a
dominant path to wealth; if the dominant path to
wealth is through the marketplace, fields like engi-
neering will be more attractive. Indeed, they found
that nations with more law students grow more
slowly than nations with more engineering stu-
dents. They suggested that the slowdown in U.S.
economic growth over the past 40 years could be
due in part to a shift in human capital toward
disciplines that are more likely to be involved in
rent seeking and other nonproductive activities.
Russell Sobel examined relationships between
the characteristics of political and economic institu-
tions for U.S. states and both productive and un-
productive entrepreneurial activity.66 His findings
were consistent with Baumol’s: Sound institutions
are associated with shifts in entrepreneurial activity
from unproductive or destructive areas to construc-
tive ones. However, Sobel did not relate Baumol’s
work to the question of policy uncertainty.
To our knowledge, Rodrik is the only one who
has made a connection between uncertainty and
rent seeking. Focusing on poorer nations, Rodrik
argued that positive policy changes may yield in-
creased investment. However, that new investment
also creates vested interests in the new policy, and
groups will expend resources to extend or enact
policies that favor their industry. While rent seeking
may promote stable policies, it is a drag on the
economy. It would be better to have an institutional
arrangement that made further policy changes
more difficult while signaling policy commitment
by the government. That would foster stable policy
without wasting resources through rent seeking.
IV. Conclusion and Implications for Tax Reform
The economic literature finds that policy uncer-
tainty is harmful to the economy in many ways. It
discourages investment, results in the misallocation
of resources, and can help explain the lackluster
U.S. economic performance in recent years. We
argue that uncertainty also fosters rent seeking and
unproductive entrepreneurship.
What can lessen tax policy uncertainty? ATRA
was at best a baby step. Enduring fundamental tax
reform certainly would help. Aside from policy
62Our empirical examinations have been consistent with that
hypothesis. See Seth H. Giertz and Jacob Feldman, ‘‘The Eco-
nomic Costs of Tax Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Funda-
mental Tax Reform,’’ Mercatus Research (Nov. 2012), at 1-31.
63See Jonathan Forman, ‘‘PAC Contributions and Effective
Corporate Tax Rates: An Empirical Study,’’ 5 Akron Tax J. 65
(1988); Forman, ‘‘PAC Contributions and Effective Corporate
Tax Rates,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 11, 1989, p. 1363.
64See Fred S. McChesney, ‘‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation
in the Economic Theory of Regulation,’’ 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (Jan.
1987).
65Kevin M. Murphy et al., ‘‘The Allocation of Talent: Impli-
cations for Growth,’’ 106 Q. J. Econ. 503 (May 1991).
66Russell S. Sobel, ‘‘Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality and
the Productivity of Entrepreneurship,’’ 23 J. Bus. Venturing 641
(2008).
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uncertainty, there are many reasons to support tax
reform. Although recent years have been marked by
great political discord, few would dispute that the
U.S. federal income tax is unfair, inefficient, and
needlessly complex and that it raises far less rev-
enue than Congress spends. Those are reasons
enough for reform. Broad principles for fundamen-
tal tax reform are beyond the scope of this report.
Instead, we consider proposals that may promote a
more stable and certain tax system in which oppor-
tunities for rent seeking are diminished.
TRA 1986, while far from perfect, closed loop-
holes, broadened the tax base, and lowered rates.
Studies have shown that it greatly reduced eco-
nomic inefficiencies, and some argue that it laid the
foundation for a strong U.S. economy during the
late 1980s and the 1990s. For example, Anil Kumar
found that TRA 1986 substantially reduced overall
deadweight loss in the economy.67 And, James
Poterba found that it substantially lowered ineffi-
ciencies in the housing market.68
However, a major shortcoming of TRA 1986 was
that the new tax system remainedmalleable.As soon
as many of the loopholes were closed, Congress
(with help from lobbyists) reopened them. As the
20th anniversary of TRA1986 approached, the Presi-
dent’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform re-
ported that Congress had amended the tax code
approximately 15,000 times since the act’s passage69
(that is more than twice a day, includingweekends!).
In their review of the effects of TRA1986,AlanAuer-
bach and Joel Slemrod concluded that ‘‘even the
simplification potential of radical tax reform de-
pends on how enduring a simple, broad-based tax
can be, in the face of constant political pressure to
reintroduce special ‘encouragements’ or to redistrib-
ute the tax burden.’’70
The problem of maintaining a reformed tax code
stems from the fact that economic efficiency lacks a
well-organized or focused interest group to repre-
sent it. Economic efficiency produces great but
widely dispersed benefits, putting it at a political
disadvantage. By contrast, carveouts and other spe-
cial provisions that make the tax system more
inefficient, complex, and unfair often confer concen-
trated benefits on a relatively small group. While
the costs of those measures generally far outweigh
the benefits, the beneficiaries are more concen-
trated, the benefit per beneficiary is often much
larger,71 and the measures lend themselves to more
effective lobbying.72
A tax code under constant revision can have
harmful effects on the economy. Even a simple, fair,
and efficient tax system fails to instill confidence if
it is in perpetual motion; a system that is amended
twice a day on average is inherently uncertain.
Constantly amending the tax system often un-
does the benefits from reform by opening or wid-
ening loopholes and by reducing the tax base. By
some measures, tax expenditures totaled more than
$1.2 trillion for 201173 — that is, the array of special
provisions, including credits and deductions, re-
sulted in forgone revenue equal to more than 50
percent of the $2.3 trillion in federal revenue actu-
ally collected.74 Those loopholes result in greater
inefficiencies and higher tax rates — or, in recent
years, greater borrowing and greater debt.
The constant changes to the tax code are the
result of rent seeking. As Fred McChesney empha-
sized, rents are extracted to maintain, not amend,
tax code provisions.75 Rent seeking is a further loss
to the economy, shifting resources from productive
activities to unproductive or destructive ones. As
Baumol argued, societies that rely heavily on insti-
tutions that reward rent seeking tend to stagnate;
societies that rely on institutions whose wealth is
achieved through private competitive markets tend
to prosper.
A. Making Tax Reform Enduring
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman was a longtime
proponent of a flat tax with no deductions other
than a personal exemption and for legitimate busi-
ness expenses.76 He favored a flat tax for many
67Anil Kumar, ‘‘Labor Supply, Deadweight Loss and Tax
Reform Act of 1986: A Nonparametric Evaluation Using Panel
Data,’’ 92 J. Pub. Econ. 236 (2008).
68James M. Poterba, ‘‘Taxation and Housing: Old Questions,
New Answers,’’ 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 237 (May 1992).
69President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform,
‘‘Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax
System’’ (Nov. 1, 2005), Doc 2005-22112, 2005 TNT 211-14.
70Alan J. Auerbach and Joel Slemrod, ‘‘The Economic Effects
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,’’ 35 J. Econ. Lit. 589 (June 1997).
71A classic example is the U.S. sugar industry, which reaps
huge benefits from U.S. tariffs on imported sugar. In some cases,
however, the groups benefiting from special tax treatment are
large.
72Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups (1965).
73Donald B. Marron, ‘‘How Large Are Tax Expenditures? A
2012 Update,’’ Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2012, p. 235,Doc 2012-7072, 2012
TNT 68-11.
74Tax expenditures are a static measure. Thus, eliminating all
tax expenditures would raise less revenue than the full value of
the tax expenditures. Also, tax expenditures are not prima facie
bad. Reasonable arguments could be made to defend many of
the provisions on grounds of either equity or efficiency. Ex-
amples include the EITC and the charitable deduction.
75McChesney, ‘‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory of Regulation,’’ 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (Jan. 1987).
76The flat tax, as proposed by Robert Hall and Alvin
Rabushka, has consumption as its base, but could be applied to
an income tax base. A flat tax is not a proportional tax (relative
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reasons, but partly because he thought it would be
more resistant to tinkering. The Mirrlees Review
recently supported Friedman’s sentiment:
Uniform taxation also simplifies the politics of
decision-making and makes tax policy less
vulnerable to lobbying pressure and short-
term political considerations. A system with
differentiated rates invites interest groups to
lobby for lower rates for their own products,
or at least rates as low as those on other
preferentially treated commodities.77
Friedman, however, was not sanguine about the
prospects of a flat tax. He wrote in 1982 that such a
system ‘‘arouses intense opposition from powerful
special interests created by the existing tax system:
recipientsofso-calledcharitablecontributions,home-
owners, the housing industry, institutions financing
housing construction, the myriad of other produc-
ers and beneficiaries from tax shelters, tax lawyers
and accountants, and last but not least, politicians
who raise campaign funds from special-interest
groups seeking to retain existing loopholes or create
new ones.’’78 McChesney echoed and expounded
on Friedman’s cynicism regarding the political pro-
cess.79
Friedman concluded that the only way to achieve
an enduring flat tax is by amending theConstitution.
Randall Holcombe also championed a ‘‘fiscal con-
stitution’’ to combat welfare losses from rent seek-
ing.80 Even tax reform that is not nearly as simple
and transparent as Friedman’s could be made more
enduring through constitutional changes. For ex-
ample, a constitutional amendment that requires su-
permajorities to pass laws on tax expenditures could
make tax reform more successful. Amending the
Constitution is a tall order, however; othermeasures,
while not as effective as a constitutional provision,
may be more attainable.
One avenue to more enduring tax reform could
come from changing the budget process, which has
undergone numerous revisions in recent decades
with limited success. One reason tax policy is
uncertain is that the U.S. tax system does not cover
current and projected spending. That has as much
to do with the spending side of the budget as it does
with the tax side. Congress regularly games the
system by producing bills designed to receive un-
realistically favorable CBO and JCT analyses. That
contributes to long-term deficits, even when legis-
lation appears to meet requirements that it not
adversely affect the deficit. A reform to address that
would require CBO and JCT to score proposed
legislation over the next 10 years both as written
and as fully phased in, with the score that is less
favorable being operative. Such a rule could reduce
the chicanery in the budget process.
Other reform options would limit the use of tax
deductions. Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, and
Maya MacGuineas have proposed limiting the use
of deductions by setting an itemized deduction
ceiling of 2 percent of total income.81 They claim
their proposal would decrease itemized filers by 75
percent from 48 million to 13 million. Len Burman
has suggested a ‘‘three strikes and you’re out’’ rule
for tax deductions and credits: His proposal would
give Congress the option of renewing tax provisions
three times and then making it permanent or elimi-
nating it. Burman’s proposal is not fundamental tax
reform, but it might reduce the uncertainty created
by the growing number of expiring tax expendi-
tures.82
B. Appendix
Suppose a venture capitalist has the option to
invest in either ethanol or solar energy. The net
return on investment depends on the outcome of
the election: If candidate A wins, tax subsidies for
ethanol will be expanded, but if candidate B wins,
tax subsidies for solar energy will be expanded. The
combined probability of winning and losing is
equal to one. The net return on investing in the
winning subsidy ex ante and ex post is the follow-
ing:
(1) Ex ante = Pr(win)* x - Pr(lose)z = Pr(win) * x -
(1 - Pr(win)) * z
(2) Ex post = y
Pr(win) signifies the probability that the tax sub-
sidy of interest is expanded while Pr(lose) signifies
the probability that the tax subsidy is not expanded.
Note that x signifies the payoff value of investing in
the increased tax subsidy of interest before its
enactment; y signifies the payoff value of investing
in the increased tax subsidy of interest after its
to its base), but is progressive because of a zero bracket, or
personal exemptions. With an income base, for example, taxes
as a share of income rise with income.
77James Mirrlees et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review 154
(2011).
78Milton Friedman, ‘‘How Flat Is Flat?’’ Newsweek, Aug. 2,
1982, at 52.
79McChesney, ‘‘What’s Mine Is Theirs: The Ever-Shimmering
Mirage of Lasting Tax Reform,’’ Library of Economics & Liberty,
Apr. 4, 2005.
80See Randall G. Holcombe, ‘‘Tax Policy From a Public
Choice Perspective,’’ 51 Nat’l Tax J. 359 (June 1998). Holcombe
suggests that a broad-based retail sales tax or VAT may be more
resistant to rent seeking.
81Martin Feldstein et al., ‘‘Capping Individual Tax Expendi-
ture Benefits,’’ NBER working paper 16291 (Apr. 2011).
82Len Burman, ‘‘Three Strikes and You’re Out for Tax Ex-
tenders,’’ Tax Vox (Feb. 1, 2012).
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enactment; and z signifies the payoff loss of invest-
ing in the increased tax subsidy of interest that is
not enacted. Thus, a risk-neutral investor will
choose to invest ex ante if:
(3) Pr(win) * x - (1 - Pr(win)) * z ≥ y
Pr(win) * (x + y) - z ≥ y
x ≥ (y/Pr(win)) - (z - z/Pr(win))
Equation 3 provides the payoff necessary for a
venture capitalist to invest in ethanol or solar
energy before the election. When there are no losses
from selecting the losing investment, then the deci-
sion to investment will be selected by the following
equation:
(4) if z = 0, then x ≥ y/Pr(win) and if Pr(win) = 0.5,
then x ≥ 2y
However, if investments are to some degree
irreversible, as many economists assert, thereby
rendering positive losses to malinvestment, then
the payoff to invest must increase, ceteris paribus.
(5) If z ≥ 0, then x ≥ 2y + z
This stylized example shows how the problem of
irreversibility on investments coupled with policy
uncertainty may lead investors to delay decision-
making until payoffs are more certain.
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